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MANDATORY RULES IN CIVIL LITIGATION:
STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE POST-GLOBALIZATION
Hannah L. Buxbaum*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The role of mandatory rules in civil litigation is an issue that has excited much
attention in the private international law academy. It presents the sort of
taxonomical challenge that conflicts scholars enjoy – which rules, precisely,
should be defined as mandatory? – and resulting efforts have yielded many
competing definitions and systems of classification.1 In addition, theories about
how to characterize the operation of mandatory rules, focusing on whether they
work within usual choice-of-law processes2 or rather outside them,3 intersect with
important debates about the nature and limits of private international law itself.4
Yet for all that attention, it is not clear that a fully realized doctrine of
mandatory rules has emerged. Work on mandatory rules begins with a somewhat
mundane observation: forum courts considering contracts governed by foreign law
*

Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law – Bloomington.
1
See Thomas G. Guedj, The Theory of the Lois de Police, A Functional Trend in
Continental Private International Law – A Comparative Analysis with Modern American
Theories, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 661, 664 (1991) (“Much has been written about peremptory
norms, mandatory rules, internationally mandatory rules, ‘lois de police,’ rules of
immediate application, ‘lois d’application necessaire,’ overriding statutes, self-limiting
rules and spatially conditioned rules”).
2
Wengler fit them into multilateral private international law processes by using the
notion of a “special connection,” which, at least formally, maintained the theory of using
the factual characteristics of a transaction to point to the law of a particular jurisdiction.
See Wilhelm Wengler, Die Anknüpfung des zwingenden Schuldrechts im internationalen
Privatrecht, 54 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 168 (1941).
This theory nevertheless departed from the Savignian approach in rejecting the unitary
application of a single law to all aspects of a particular transaction or relationship.
3
Francescakis viewed the operation of mandatory rules differently, describing them
as norms of forum law that demanded immediate application and therefore pre-empted the
normal choice-of-law process. See Ph. Francescakis, Quelques précisions sur les “lois
d’application immédiate” et leurs rapports avec les règles de conflits de lois, REVUE
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 1 (1966). See also Michael Whincop & Mary
Keyes, Putting the “Private” Back Into Private International Law: Default Rules and the
Proper Law of the Contract, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 515, 521 (1997) (“Mandatory
substantive law rules purport to exist over and above the domain of private international
law”).
4
See, e.g., Frank Vischer, General Course on Private International Law, 232
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 150-51 (1992) (discussing these questions in connection with the
more general question of whether foreign public norms may be applied outside the
enacting jurisdiction, and, if so, what the consequences would be for the field of private
international law).
21
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will sometimes override that law, applying a rule of forum law in its place. Such
action is the usual outcome, for instance, in cases presenting a conflict between
foreign lex contractus and a forum law that protects an important public policy.5
A court is well positioned to determine whether its own country’s law demands
application to the transaction in question, and, as an organ of the enacting state,
clearly has the authority to apply that law. Indeed, the forum court may be
required to apply it.6 Thus, the general proposition that party autonomy may yield
to certain laws of the forum is uncontroversial, and the doctrine of mandatory
rules, to the extent that it simply reflects and explicates this reality,
unobjectionable.7
This starting point, however, has been used as the foundation for the
articulation of a more robust doctrine that would permit courts, in certain
circumstances, to apply not only the mandatory law of the forum, but also the
mandatory law of other countries connected with the transaction in question. The
justification for such a doctrine lies in perceptions of the appropriate role for
courts in addressing international disputes. In its fullest form, the doctrine
supports two different aspects of that role. First, vesting courts with broad
authority to apply foreign law recognizes their ability to correct for imbalances in
the bargaining process. Ian Fletcher, for example, noted that
the increasingly common judicial practice of according effect to [mandatory]
rules even in cases where they belong neither to the lex fori nor to the lex
contractus is a remarkable example of the extent to which in recent times the
previously sacrosanct principle of party autonomy in matters of contract has been
eroded in response to a more activist view of the “appropriate” function of the
Court, which may be summarised as being to ensure the prevalence of an
idealised concept of “justice”, if necessary by dirigiste means rather than by
adhering to the traditional role of “neutral umpire”. Recently-elaborated theories
regarding the necessity for accommodating provisions of mandatory rules of law
which, if more traditional conflicts approaches were adhered to, would play no
part in regulating the parties’ relationship, may thus be seen as a logical
counterpart of the increasing trend towards interventionism within the domestic
legal sphere for the purpose of redressing social and economic imbalances by
means of rules inhibiting freedom of contract.8

5

See, e.g., North American Bank, Ltd. v. Schulman, 474 N.Y.S.2d 383 (N.Y.Co. Ct.
1984) (finding that provisions of a loan agreement providing for the application of Israeli
law should yield to application of New York’s usury laws).
6
See Guedj, supra note 1, at 667; but see infra at Part III on the weakening of this
principle.
7
Francescakis, in his seminal study, restricted his observations to the application of
mandatory law of the forum itself. See supra note 3.
8
IAN F. FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 169-70
(1982) (internal citations omitted).
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In this aspect, the doctrine supports the operation of a judicial function that
had in some systems gained strength in the purely domestic context, recognizing
its extension to cross-border transactions.
Second, recognizing the authority of courts to apply foreign law validates
judicial participation in the processes of cross-border governance, in the sense of
supporting the important regulatory and policy goals of other nations. This notion
was voiced frequently in the discussions surrounding adoption of the Rome
Convention, which addressed the particular needs of the European Community.
Paul Lagarde, discussing Article 7 of the Rome Convention, stated that “[t]he
basic idea stems from an awareness of the necessary solidarity existing between
the legal policies of the various States.”9 Beyond that specific regional context,
this aspect of the doctrine speaks to the role of courts within the international
community more broadly. As one commentator concluded, “the close social,
economical and political interdependence among modern States commands a
minimum of co-operation which in turn gives some credit to a claim that the
judge, at least in some instances, should apply the mandatory rules of third states,
too.”10 Here, the doctrine may be viewed as one instantiation of the more general
doctrine of judicial comity.11
There was a hope behind the doctrine of mandatory rules, then, of promoting
certain kinds of judicial activity in the arena of international commerce – of
encouraging a certain judicial role in the overall scheme of cross-border
regulation. With respect to the first goal – enhancing the role of courts in
addressing imbalances between contract parties – the doctrine’s evolution has
been quite successful. Some cases show courts looking to foreign mandatory law
in order to correct for inequalities in particular areas of law; for instance, by
invalidating unfair termination clauses in distribution agreements.12 More
importantly, that role has to some degree been institutionalized. In the Rome
Convention, for example, consumer contracts and individual employment
contracts were simply carved out of the general rule providing for the enforcement

9

Paul Lagarde, The E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, in HARMONIZATION OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, AND CORPORATION LAW 49, 61 (Peter E. Herzog ed.,
1983). See also Vischer, supra note 4, at 168 (discussing Wengler’s articulation of the
doctrine as concerned with “the necessity of ... assistance for the interests of foreign
States”).
10
Guedj, supra note 1, at 671.
11
See MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE
THROUGH THE JUNGLE 30 (1995) (“When properly used, the doctrine of mandatory rules ...
serves as a means to exercise comity and to strengthen the cooperation among nations
through mutual assistance in the enforcement of especially vital policies.”).
12
See, e.g., Southern Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. Potter & Brumfield, 410 F.Supp.1339
(S.D. N.Y. 1976); Caribbean Wholesales & Service Corp. v. US JVC Corp., 855 F.Supp.
627 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (both applying Puerto Rican law protecting dealers).
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of party-selected law,13 and subjected instead to special rules. These rules
authorize forum courts to apply the law of the consumer’s home country14 and the
law of the employee’s place of employment,15 respectively, if those laws are more
protective than party-selected law.
Encouraging courts to protect the weaker party in contracts, however, is the
narrower, perhaps the less ambitious,16 goal of the doctrine. (Some commentators
in fact query whether rules correcting for bargaining imbalances may properly be
considered mandatory rules at all.17) With respect to the second goal, by contrast,
the doctrine has not evolved substantially; while the quite ordinary application of
forum mandatory law continues, no pattern of assistance of foreign interests has
emerged. There is certainly no body of cases applying foreign mandatory law in
this way18 – commentary depends largely on the same small handful of decisions,
13

Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 80/934/EEC, 1980
O.J. (L266), at Art. 3(1) (“A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties”).
14
Id. at Art. 5(2) (providing that in consumer contracts “a choice of law made by the
parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to
him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual
residence”).
15
Id. at Art. 6(1) (providing that “in a contract of employment a choice of law made
by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded
to him by the mandatory rules of the law which would be applicable ... in the absence of
choice”).
16
It is generally easier to achieve legislative agreement on rules that guarantee a fair
bargaining process than on rules protecting specific substantive policies. The former seek
merely to establish a level playing field, and thus promote party autonomy as a public
interest; that is itself a fairly common interest among states, and is also not ordinarily in
conflict with other public norms.
17
See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 4, at 157-58 (“It is debatable whether protective
private law rules whose objective is the safeguard of a party’s position in a contract or
other relationship may enter into the category of norms which are to be applied
irrespective of the bilateral conflict rules,” although concluding that in light partly of the
“social orientation of the modern welfare State,” it would be unrealistic to limit the
category of mandatory rules to those “either part of the State organization or [that] secure
the State’s functioning.”); see also Nathalie Voser, Mandatory Rules of Law as a
Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 319, 325 (1996) (stating that the characteristic goal of international mandatory
rules is to pursue public interests, and concluding that “domestic mandatory rules for the
protection of the ‘weaker’ party should not be viewed as international mandatory rules”);
cf. Pierre Mayer, Mandatory rules of law in international arbitration, 2 ARB. INT’L 274,
275 (1986) (putting rules “protect[ing] parties presumed to be in an inferior bargaining
position” into the category of mandatory norms); T.C. Hartley, Beyond the Proper Law:
Mandatory Rules Under Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, 4 EUR. L. REV. 236, 238 (identifying as two categories of mandatory rules
those protecting the weaker party in a contractual relationship, and those promoting
“social, economic or political” policies of the enacting state).
18
See Johan Erauw, Observations About Mandatory Rules Imposed on Transatlantic
Commercial Relationships, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 263, 267 (2004) (“Although there has
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most of which recognize the possibility of such application but do not actually
apply foreign law.19
In this stagnation of the doctrine’s development, as well as in the earlier
vision of more robust judicial cooperation, there may be something of interest to
those thinking today about the role of mandatory rules in dispute resolution
(including through arbitration), as well as those interested in the globalization of
judicial processes more generally. Part II of this paper explores why the doctrine
of mandatory rules has failed to materialize into a strong form of judicial support
for foreign policies. It addresses this question from a functional perspective,
examining barriers to judicial application of mandatory third-state norms in
international contract litigation. Part III then inquires whether, in the era of
globalization – both of commerce and, according to some, of the judiciary – any
signs point to a resuscitation of this vision.
II. OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE DOCTRINE OF MANDATORY RULES
This section examines some of the reasons that courts are deterred from
applying foreign mandatory law in international contract disputes. The first
(difficulties in ascertaining the mandatory nature of a particular norm) is
implicated in every case involving a potentially applicable foreign rule; the others
may be presented more sharply in particular systems or with respect to particular
subject areas.
A. Difficulties in Determining the Mandatory Character of Foreign Rules
Courts considering the application of foreign mandatory law face certain
obstacles that are present whenever any kind of foreign rule is considered –
difficulties in properly ascertaining and interpreting the content of another
country’s law.20 Moreover, they face the additional difficulty of determining
whether the rule in question is in fact mandatory. One traditional way of framing
this question is to ask whether the rule “wishes” to apply regardless of the law
otherwise applicable; that is, whether, from the perspective of the enacting state,
the legislative interest underpinning the rule is such that it must apply to the
relevant transaction or relationship. In some cases, the law in question may

been much talk about [the possibility of applying foreign ‘public rules’], it is unclear if
there has been a case where this has occurred”).
19
See, e.g., The Alnati, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, 13 May 1966 (including dictum
to the effect that Dutch courts might in some circumstances give effect to foreign
mandatory law, but concluding that the foreign law at issue in the case was not of a
mandatory nature); see also discussion in Guedj, supra note 1, at 672-73.
20
See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, General Course on Private International Law,
193 RECUEIL DES COURS 119, 202-05 (1985).
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contain an explicit provision on this point.21 In most, however, it will not, leaving
the forum court to ascertain from its content alone whether it demands
application.22 As many commentators have suggested, the difficulty of this task
goes a long way toward explaining the reluctance of courts to apply foreign
mandatory rules.23
B. Limitations on the Applicability of Foreign Public Law
As noted above, the category of mandatory rules is generally seen to include
two groups, broadly defined, of norms: one dealing with protection of certain
contract parties, and another expressing the fundamental policies of the enacting
states.24 Many of the rules in the latter group embody the public regulatory and
economic policies of the enacting state, including, for instance, competition law
and securities regulation. The question whether these rules may be applied by the
court of another state intersects with another doctrine: the public law taboo. On
the traditional view – described by one commentator as “the most limiting view” –
the court of one state may not apply the public law of another.25 Courts adhering
to this view would therefore decline to apply many foreign mandatory rules on
this basis alone: even if they concluded that a foreign rule demanded application,
they would find themselves precluded from applying it if it fell within the scope of
the taboo.26
21

See, e.g., the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 or the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act of 1936, both of which expressly contemplate application to foreign transactions.
22
See, e.g., the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, whose scope of application is
notoriously unclear.
23
See Dimitrios Evrigenis, Interest Analysis: A Continental Perspective, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 525, 526 (1985) (in discussing the related technique of interest analysis, stating that
“inviting even the most learned judge to identify spatially operating interests actually or
purportedly underlying the substantive rules of foreign countries connected with the case
would not be only inhuman but illusory”).
24
For further differentiation, see MARC BLESSING, IMPACT OF THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF MANDATORY RULES ON INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS 14-15 (1999) (sketching out the following categories of mandatory rules: (1)
those protecting monetary interests of the enacting state (e.g., exchange control
regulations); (ii) those of a fiscal nature (e.g., customs regulations); (iii) those
safeguarding economic interests of the enacting state (e.g., import and export restrictions);
(iv) those protecting the welfare of certain individuals (e.g., rules protecting the weaker
contract party); (v) those serving political or military interests (e.g., embargoes); (vi) those
aimed at protecting environmental welfare; and (vii) those protecting open markets (e.g.,
competition laws).
25
David Jackson, Mandatory Rules and Rules of “Ordre Public,” in CONTRACT
CONFLICTS at 59, 60 (P.M. North ed., 1982); see generally William S. Dodge, Breaking
the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161 (2002).
26
On this view, it would not matter whether the rule in question was part of the law
chosen by the parties or the law of some other interested jurisdiction. Even though the
mandatory rule might be part of the law chosen by the parties to govern the contract, and
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C. Lack of Judicial Authority to Apply Foreign Mandatory Law
A court finding that a foreign rule demands application, and that such
application is not barred by the public law taboo, still seeks a path to that
application.27 In some narrow contexts, that path is clear. International accords
covering certain substantive areas permit the courts of signatory states to apply
foreign mandatory law. These include the Hague Conventions on Agency28 and
Trusts,29 as well as Article VIII(2)(b) of the International Monetary Fund
Agreement 1945, which effectively requires member states to honor the
mandatory exchange control regulations of other members.30 Additionally, as
noted above, special choice-of-law rules may be in place that dictate the
application of foreign law in order to protect the weaker party in particular kinds
of contractual relationships, such as employees or distributors.31
More often, however, a forum court lacks such clear guidance, and must turn
to general principles of private international law. Some national regimes
specifically permit the application of foreign mandatory rules: Swiss private
international law, for instance, explicitly authorizes Swiss courts to apply the
mandatory law of another country in appropriate circumstances.32 Similarly, and
most famously, the Rome Convention provides that

even though its application in that sense would be “invisible,” the forum would
nevertheless lack the authority to apply it. But see Whincop & Keyes, supra note 3, at
521-22 (noting that courts are more likely to apply foreign mandatory law if it is part of
the law chosen to govern the contract).
27
Serge Lazareff, Mandatory Extraterritorial Application of National Law, 11 ARB.
INT’L 137, 138 (1995): “When confronted with the mandatory rules of a foreign state ...
[the judge] must refer either to a specific provision from his own law, including case law,
or to an international convention authorizing him to [apply that law].”
28
Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Agency, Art. 16 (“In the
application of this Convention, effect may be given to the mandatory rules of any State
with which the situation has a significant connection, if and in so far as, under the law of
that State, those rules must be applied whatever the law specified by its choice of law
rules”).
29
Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their
Recognition, Art. 16. (“If another State has a sufficiently close connection with a case
then, in exceptional circumstances, effect may also be given to rules of that State [which
must be applied even to international situations, irrespective of rules of conflict of laws]”).
30
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. VIII(2)(b) provides
that “Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member.”
31
These include Rome Convention, Articles 5 and 6, discussed supra at notes 13-15
and accompanying text.
32
Swiss Private International Law Code, Art. 19(1); see also discussion in BLESSING,
supra note 24, at 54-55.
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When applying ... the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory
rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close
connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules
must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract.33

In legal systems lacking such legislation, a general comity jurisprudence
might be in place that permits the application of foreign law.34 In addition, where
the foreign mandatory rule in question is part of the lex contractus – that is, where
it is a rule of the state whose law was chosen by the parties to govern the
contract35 – a court may turn to the general conflicts principle favoring party
autonomy, and enforce the rule on that basis.36 Understandably, however, the
further a forum court is from a clear directive covering a particular substantive
area, the less likely it is to follow such a path and apply foreign mandatory rules.
33

Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, supra note 13, at
Art. 7(1). The Convention will be replaced by Regulation No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. L 177/6, when that
regulation enters into force in 2009. Article 9(3) of that Regulation provides:
Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the
country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been
performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the
performance of the contract unlawful. In considering whether to give effect to
those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the
consequences of their application or non-application.
For a similar approach, see also PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW PARTS I
AND II, Art. 1:103(2) (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000) (“Effect should nevertheless
be given to those mandatory rules of national, supranational and international law which,
according to the relevant rules of private international law, are applicable irrespective of
the law governing the contract”).
34
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b), suggesting a
practice of such application under U.S. law; see also J.J. Fawcett, Evasion of Law and
Mandatory Rules in Private International Law, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 44, 55 (“The only
basis for a national interest [in upholding a foreign law] is that of considerations of comity
of nations”).
35
Assuming that the parties did not explicitly exclude mandatory law in selecting the
law to govern their contract.
36
The general question whether mandatory rules should be applied as part of the lex
causae is debated among commentators. Compare Hans W. Baade, The Operation of
Foreign Public Law, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429, 462 (1995) (citing the 1975 resolution of the
Institut de Droit International and describing “an emerging consensus in favor of the
general application (to the extent compatible with forum public policy) of foreign public
law as an incidental but determinative element of the lex causae”) and Vischer, supra note
4, at 166-68 (discussing the debate over the “integral application of the lex causae,
irrespective of the nature of the foreign rules in question”), with Voser, supra note 17, at
323 (supporting the counter-position: mandatory rules of the lex causae should not
automatically be applied, because that application would “ha[ve] the effect of granting the
interests of the state which provides the lex causae an unjustified primary position over
other states’ interests”).
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D. Absence of a Requirement to Apply Foreign Mandatory Law
Even in its most concretized form, as in the Rome Convention and the other
legislative instruments discussed above, the “rule” regarding application of
foreign mandatory law is still merely discretionary.37 Comity, even less concrete
as a basis for applying foreign law, also operates as a discretionary principle.
Thus, even when the path to application of a foreign norm is established, courts do
not feel pressed to take it. The content of many foreign mandatory rules makes
courts understandably reluctant to apply them absent an explicit requirement to do
so. Such law often expresses political mandates in which courts in other countries
wish to avoid entanglement, such as embargoes or boycotts targeting specific
countries.38 In addition, forum courts may find the proposed application of a rule
to be contrary to public international law39 or simply to constitute an overaggressive act of the enacting state.40 Thus, while there may be some “easy” cases
– involving contracts intended to violate foreign export restrictions,41 for instance,
or to avoid currency controls42 – most present difficulties that forum courts wish
simply to avoid.
Some commentators have suggested ways to evaluate a country’s demand for
application of its law, attempting to clarify when the forum court should exercise
its discretion in favor of that law. For example, one suggested approach is to
focus on common values, reasoning that deference to foreign mandatory norms is
appropriate when those norms “express[] values shared in common and which the

37

Despite this, several countries nevertheless reserved application of that section
when adopting the Rome Convention.
38
See Vischer, supra note 4, at 175 (“[I]n the absence of clear directives from the
forum’s executive authorities, I doubt whether it is the task of civil courts to evaluate the
ultimate merits of foreign political enactments and assist foreign States in the
extraterritorial enforcement of their political objectives”).
39
See Erauw, supra note 18, at 282 (noting the justifiability of a forum state’s refusal
to apply a foreign state’s rule when the latter is viewed as incompatible with public
international law).
40
Several commentators point to U.S. antitrust law as an example: if its wish to apply
to extraterritorial conduct is viewed as an illegitimate assertion of authority on the part of
the United States, they suggest that foreign courts would be justified in refusing such
application. See, e.g., Lagarde, supra note 9, at 62.
41
See Trevor C. Hartley, Mandatory Rules in International Contracts: The Common
Law Approach, 266 RECUEIL DES COURS 337, 395 (1997) (discussing contracts in which
“the direct purpose ... is to violate foreign law in the foreign country”); Fawcett, supra
note 34, at 52 (framing the question in order to “concentrate on the content of the law that
is being evaded and on the question whether the thwarting of this law is against the
national interest”).
42
See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 489 (1962)
(“Whether because of a certain international solidarity in financial matters, or because of
special international agreements [on that topic], American courts seem to be willing to
strike down contracts concluded in violation of the currency laws of foreign countries...”).
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receiving country is itself willing to protect.”43 Others attempt to distinguish
between the “legitimate applicability of mandatory rules of law as deduced
rationally from the purpose – itself legitimate – of the law in question, and ... a
broader scope of application claimed in an imperialistic manner by the State
having promulgated the law,”44 or to set aside “purely selfish or parochial
interests” of the enacting state.45 However, these various axes proposed to separate
appropriate cases for the application of mandatory rules from inappropriate cases
fail to provide much concrete guidance to courts, and have therefore not
encouraged greater application of the mandatory rules of third states.
For all of these reasons, there is simply no practice of free application by
national courts of the mandatory rules of other states when it does not form part of
the lex contractus. Despite considerable attention to the doctrine, and some
degree of institutionalization in the Rome Convention and other instruments, the
vision of generous judicial assistance in furthering the goals of other states has
failed to materialize.
III. MANDATORY LAW AND GLOBALIZATION
As discussed above, the demands of transnational commerce, the growing
interdependence of states, and the resulting need for greater international
cooperation were in the past identified as a basis for extending the doctrine of
mandatory rules to permit the application not only of forum law but also of the
law of other states. One might therefore speculate that the international litigation
climate today would be hospitable to further development of the doctrine.
Students of globalization, and particularly of the role of courts within the
globalized system, have identified a number of trends that are often grouped under
the general rubric of “judicial globalization.”46 These include a variety of forms
of increased cooperation – for instance, heightened communication across courts,
willingness of domestic courts to review foreign decisions when interpreting
domestic standards, and the development of negotiated solutions to cross-border
cases in areas such as insolvency or group securities litigation.47 Within this
climate, one might expect to see a resurgence of interest in the application of
mandatory rules as another form of judicial cooperation in addressing cross-border
transactions.

43

Bernhard Grossfeld & C. Paul Rogers, A Shared Values Approach to Jurisdictional
Conflicts in International Economic Law, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 931, 939 (1983). See
infra at Part III (discussing further the consequences of a focus on shared substance).
44
Mayer, supra note 17, at 289.
45
Voser, supra note 17, at 357.
46
This rubric encompasses a number of quite disparate issues, including the
proliferation of tribunals, the use of foreign law in domestic decisionmaking, and the
“globalization” of the judiciary itself, by means of judicial networks and otherwise.
47
See generally 38, 39 & 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. (2003, 2004 & 2005) (symposia on
judicial globalization providing an overview of these issues).
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Interestingly, however, what we see is not an expansion of the doctrine, but
rather, arguably, a contraction. Far from applying foreign mandatory rules more
frequently, some forum courts seem to be foregoing even application of forum
mandatory rules, deferring instead to party-chosen law in international contract
disputes. This trend manifests itself in the United States in a particular doctrinal
development – increased enforcement of foreign forum-selection and governinglaw clauses in cases implicating public regulatory policy – and also in an
emerging theoretical framework that takes party autonomy as an appropriate
foundation for a regulatory choice-of-law approach.
Many commentators have identified a weakening or dilution of U.S.
mandatory law in the context of its application to cross-border contracts, a
development generally identified as beginning with decisions to permit the
arbitration of claims arising under federal regulatory law.48 U.S. courts are
increasingly willing to forego the application of U.S. regulatory law to
transactions that fall within the scope of that law. The cases dealing with the
aftermath of Lloyd’s of London’s collapse have become the paradigmatic
illustration of this trend. In those cases, U.S. investors who had signed investment
contracts containing choice-of-law and forum selection clauses in favor of the
United Kingdom nevertheless sued in U.S. courts, asserting that Lloyd’s had
violated U.S. securities law by fraudulently inducing them to join certain
insurance syndicates.49 Pointing to the strong public policies underlying the
relevant regulatory law (and the explicit anti-waiver provisions it includes), they
argued that the U.S. courts should reject enforcement of the choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law clauses.50 They argued, in other words, that securities law is
mandatory and thus demands application regardless of the law otherwise
applicable to the contract.
The courts hearing the Lloyd’s cases all began with the principle that advance
agreement regarding dispute resolution is critical in international commerce, and
that freely negotiated choice-of-law and forum selection clauses are therefore
presumptively valid.51 They then made an interesting move. Rather than
addressing directly the question whether federal securities law was mandatory,
and must automatically be applied in the U.S. litigation, they held that the clauses
would be enforced, and the U.S. lawsuits dismissed, unless the result would be to
undermine the public policy in question:
48

See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR
REASONABLENESS 212-23 (1996) (tracing the progression of this dilution).
49
See, e.g., Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Bonny v.
Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d
1289 (9th Cir. 1998). These lawsuits were initiated following Lloyd’s efforts, in U.K.based litigation, to obtain payments of amounts assessed against the U.S. syndicate
investors. See generally Hannah Buxbaum, The Role of Public Policy in International
Contracts: Reflections on the U.S. Litigation Concerning Lloyd’s of London, 3/2002
PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAX] 232 (2002).
50
See, e.g., Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d at 1361-62.
51
See, e.g., id. at 1362-63; Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d at 1294.
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By including the anti-waiver provisions in the securities laws, Congress made
clear that the public policy of these laws should not be thwarted. ... To allow
Lloyd’s to avoid liability for putative violations of the 1933 Act would
contravene important American policies unless remedies available in the selected
forum do not subvert the public policy of that Act.52

Reviewing the substantive remedies provided under U.K. law, the courts
concluded that the foreign law afforded a cause of action similar to that available
under U.S. law.53 On this basis, they held that “[t]he specter of liability for breach
of contract should act as an adequate deterrent to the exploitation of American
investors,”54 and that the forum selection and choice-of-law clauses should be
enforced. The decisions therefore rejected the application of U.S. regulatory law
even after concluding that the transactions in question might indeed fall within its
scope.55
To some extent, these decisions may be read simply as an expedient
recognition of the fact that few cross-border transactions today are connected so
closely with a single jurisdiction that only one state can fairly lay claim to
exclusive application of its rule.56 Rather, a number of mandatory rules might be
candidates for application. More importantly, though, these decisions to forego
application of forum regulatory law suggest that the rules in question may no
longer be mandatory at all. A classic definition of a mandatory rule defines it as
“an imperative provision of law which must be applied to an international
relationship irrespective of the law that [otherwise] governs that relationship.”57
Judicial recognition that an international transaction falls within the scope of a
U.S. regulation, but that the regulation can be displaced by party-chosen law,
implies that the regulation no longer operates as a mandatory rule of the forum.58
52

Bonny v. Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d at 160-61.
For criticism of this conclusion, see Courtland H. Peterson, Choice of Law and
Forum Clauses and the Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments Revisited Through the
Lloyd’s of London Cases, 60 LA. L. REV. 1259 (2000).
54
Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d at 1366.
55
A related trend is seen in another area: courts have used the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to dismiss claims falling within the scope of domestic regulatory law,
accepting that the claims would then be subject to foreign law. See Hannah L. Buxbaum,
Regulatory policy in transnational litigation: the influence of judicial globalization, in
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ERIK JAYME 73, 79-81 (Heinz-Peter Mansel et al. eds., 2004).
56
See Horatia Muir-Watt & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Party Autonomy and
Mandatory Rules in a Global World, 4 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES (2004) at 3, available
at http://www.bepress.com/gj.
57
Mayer, supra note 17, at 274.
58
Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A
Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383, 407 (2003) (suggesting that some
such rules are now “only ‘semi-mandatory,’ inasmuch as their presence is no longer an
obstacle to the circulation of foreign judgments and awards which do not necessarily
comply with their requirements”); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules:
Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 711 (1999) (arguing that the
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This line of cases therefore suggests that the trend developing in today’s litigation
climate is not toward increased application of foreign mandatory rules, but in the
opposite direction – toward narrowing the scope of application of even forum
mandatory rules. This in turn indicates that courts may view greater deference to
party autonomy, rather than broader recognition and application of foreign
mandatory law, as the better response to the complexities of global transactions.
In its most robust form, this doctrinal approach also supports a broader
normative vision of a choice-of-law system that relies entirely – with respect to
public law as well as private law – on party autonomy.59 In such a system, parties
would be free to select the public regulatory regime governing their relationship
just as they select the private law governing it.60 Commentators proposing such a
regime proceed on the assumption that party choice is the optimal method of
allocating resources, apart from the rare cases61 in which particular third-party
effects require intervention (that is, in which public interests fail to coincide with
private welfare as served by the chosen rules).62 They argue that opening such
laws to choice by parties both within and outside the enacting state can improve
global welfare,63 and that giving parties free choice from among competing
regulatory regimes would foster a salutary level of regulatory competition.64 On
this view, party autonomy can itself serve a regulatory function, in the sense that it
can correct for overly intrusive, welfare-diminishing regulations.65 In semi-strong
form, this theory would dramatically reduce the application of mandatory rules, as

enforcement of arbitration agreements in disputes raising mandatory law “effectively
converts [it] into default law”).
59
See Muir Watt, supra note 58, at 388 (describing “the increasing pressure to include
public regulation within the scope of conflicts of laws”).
60
See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 914
(2002) (suggesting that “parties should be permitted to choose from the law of any
jurisdiction or even to agree on a set of custom rules to govern the transaction entirely
through contract”); Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of
Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003) (focusing on the domestic context).
61
See Whincop & Keyes, supra note 4, at 542 (“Given that contracts generally
produce few externalities, courts should uphold bargaining rather than attempt to stifle
it”); cf. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 65 (1991)
(stating that in such cases the courts have “narrowly construed systemic interests,
protecting the power of multinationals to trade and invest with minimal interference from
national regulations at the expense of the rights of third parties such as consumers and
small investors”).
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Muir Watt, supra note 58, at 387; Guzman, supra note 60, at 914.
63
See Erin Ann O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of
Laws, 90 GEO. L.J. 941, 943 (noting that where a particular regime has developed
sophisticated rules for the regulation of particular transactions, making those rules
available for choice by outside parties increases global welfare).
64
See Guzman, supra note 60; Whincop & Keyes, supra note 3.
65
Muir Watt & di Brozolo, supra note 56, at 4-5.
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norms of forum law66 would override party-chosen law only when clear detriment
to third-party interests would follow from application of the latter. In its strongest
form, this theory would essentially eliminate many categories of mandatory rules
altogether, permitting parties to choose freely among competing regulatory
norms.67
Yet what we observe courts doing in the Lloyd’s cases and similar litigation68
indicates that certain boundaries remain both to the doctrinal development and
also to the theoretical vision. The action the U.S. courts take is actually quite
limited: they decide not to dishonor contractual choices of law and forum by
insisting instead on application of their own national law. It is not clear from
these cases that absent a contractual selection of a foreign forum, U.S. courts
would similarly decline to apply federal regulatory law to claims falling within
that law’s scope.69 Thus, while it is fair to conclude that these cases substantially
elevate the interest of party autonomy,70 it would be overstating the point to
conclude categorically that the norms in question are no longer mandatory.
Moreover, these cases reflect no real abandonment of the state interests
behind the relevant regulatory law. The cases are clear that party-chosen law can
displace U.S. regulatory law only if the foreign norm to which the transaction will
be subjected is substantively similar to the U.S. law in question.71 This limitation
signals the continued commitment of domestic courts to the particular policies
underlying U.S. regulatory law, indicating the unlikelihood of a shift to a system

66

See Whincop & Keyes, supra note 3, at 528 (discussing limitations on the parties’
freedom to choose applicable law in situations involving a third party effect, and noting
that “[s]uch restrictions on choice of law appear to be (and in our opinion should be)
limited to situations where the mandatory rule is that of the forum”).
67
This approach would in essence render the mandatory rules doctrine superfluous.
See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998) (developing
this approach in the context of securities regulation); Robert K. Rasmussen, A New
Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (1997) (bankruptcy law).
68
See, e.g., Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 1999) (enforcing
party choice in a case involving antitrust law).
69
In addition, while it is true that all eight of the Circuit Courts of Appeals hearing
these cases subscribed to the approach herein described, it is also true that the Lloyd’s
cases presented a quite particularized set of facts (sophisticated parties, fully negotiated
agreements, and – perhaps most importantly – the pressing need to rehabilitate the U.K.
insurance market by funding the Equitas reorganization with reinsurance premiums) from
which it may be difficult to extrapolate a general rule.
70
See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public
Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219, 242-44
(2001) (making this argument).
71
Cf. Swiss Private International Law Code, Art. 19(2) (stating that in deciding
whether to apply the mandatory rule of another country, a court must consider whether the
application of that rule would result in an adequate decision under Swiss legal concepts).
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based on unfettered party autonomy.72 Thus, we circle back to the observation
with which we began: courts considering contracts governed by foreign law will
sometimes override that law, applying a rule of forum law in its place. That some
courts may today choose to do so less frequently does not signal an abandonment
of the mandatory rules doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
I will close with one brief historical observation, going back to the time when
commentators and legislators were actively considering whether the doctrine
supporting application of forum mandatory rules could or should be expanded to
encourage the application of foreign mandatory rules. That project was focused
largely around the adoption of the Rome Convention, and so was undertaken
against the backdrop of regional harmonization. The notion of more flexible,
multilateral assistance in the sense of honoring and upholding the laws of other
states therefore served a political imperative; in addition, it took for granted the
underlying similarity of legal regimes in the European states. Consider the
following statement, made in 1982:
To a traditional conflicts approach [the suggestion of applying a mandatory rule
of a third country] is anathema for there is simply no conflicts gate through which
the rule can get at the issue. But, it may be argued, such an approach is too
simplistic in an age of increasing state interest in arrangements made by
individuals. Particularly is this so when (as with the Convention) states are
creating a conflicts framework for a “community” – a community which must
depend on reciprocal respect for the views of its members.73

Even in the European Union, however, the context of the debate over
mandatory rules has changed. Far from speaking to the expansive application of
third-state foreign law, a current point of contention there is whether the
application of forum mandatory law should be limited. Recent jurisprudence
suggests that regulatory barriers between member states, having been removed by
communitarization, cannot be “reconstituted” through the application by one state
of its own more stringent standards to a transaction governed by the law of
another state.74 Thus, a forum court is not free to apply its own mandatory law if
72

Thus, some commentators have suggested that a certain level of substantive
harmonization must be a condition for any system based on recognition of party-chosen
law. See, e.g., Muir Watt, supra note 58, at 397 (suggesting alternatively that “recognition
of foreign regimes could be ... predicated on certain quality requirements”).
73
David Jackson, Mandatory Rules and Rules of “Ordre Public,” in CONTRACT
CONFLICTS 59, 61-62 (P.M. North ed., 1982).
74
See generally Horatia Muir Watt, Experiences From Europe: Legal Diversity and
the Internal Market, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429 (2004) (discussing the European
Commission’s work in the area of contract law), and id. at 440-43 (discussing recent
European case law); and id. at 447 (“...minimum harmonization of national laws is to be
combined with a principle of mutual recognition of equivalent domestic standards”).
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the purpose behind that law is being served by the chosen law of another member
state; rather, it must apply the latter.75 This approach therefore mirrors to some
extent the U.S. doctrine discussed above: it reduces the number of situations in
which a forum court may override party-chosen law with its own mandatory rule.
And it limits the development of the mandatory rules doctrine in a similar way: it
neither eliminates mandatory rules altogether nor establishes a framework for
broad application of foreign law. Moreover, in its explicit connection to EU
standards, it suggests again that the mandatory rules doctrine may be tied
inextricably to political imperatives,76 and to a base level of similarity in the
policies expressed by competing rules.77
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See Milena Sterio, The Globalization Era and the Conflict of Laws: What Europe
Could Learn From the United States and Vice Versa, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
161, 169-70 (2005) (discussing the ruling of the European Court of Justice in the Arblade
case, 1999 ECR I-8453 (1999)); see also id. at 171 (discussing the proposal of the
European Group for Private International Law that effect be given to mandatory rules only
to the extent that application does not constitute an unjustified restriction on freedom of
movement within the Community).
76
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